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Abstract. When dealing with a certain class of physical systems, the mathematical 
characterization of a generic system aims to describe the phase portrait of all its possible 
states. Because they are defined only up to isomorphism, the mathematical objects 
involved are “schematic structures”. If one imposes the condition that these mathematical 
definitions completely capture the physical information of a given system, one is led to a 
strong requirement of individuation for physical states. However, we show there are not 
enough qualitatively distinct properties in an abstract Hilbert space to fulfill such a 
requirement. It thus appears there is a fundamental tension between the physicist’s 
purpose in providing a mathematical definition of a mechanical system and a feature of 
the basic formalism used in the theory. We will show how group theory provides tools to 
overcome this tension and to define physical properties.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The progressive mathematization of both Classical and Quantum Mechanics 
witnessed over more than a century has provided increasingly abstract ways of thinking 
of physical systems. It has become the norm amongst theoretical and mathematical 
physicists to characterize a generic physical system by appeal to some specific class of 
mathematical objects. For example, in Carlo Rovelli’s book on Quantum Gravity, one 
finds that “a [classical, non-relativistic] dynamical system is determined by a triple (Γ0, 
ω0, H0), where Γ0 is a manifold, ω0 is a symplectic two-form and H0 is a function on Γ0” 
(Rovelli 2004, p. 100) whereas “a given quantum [non-relativistic] system is defined by a 
family (generally an algebra) of operators Ai, including H0 [the Hamiltonian], defined 
over an Hilbert space H 0” (Rovelli 2004, p. 165). Statements of the sort can be found in 
almost any book that introduces the mathematical formalisms of Classical and Quantum 
Mechanics.  
This form of discourse, that “defines”, “determines” or “characterizes” physical 
systems by the specification of some abstract mathematical object, offers a particularly 
nice setting where to study the relation between the ontology of Physics and that of 
Mathematics. On a first reading, defining a system as e.g. a symplectic manifold seems a 
markedly stronger claim than simply characterizing it by appeal to the notion of 
symplectic manifold. The former can be read as an ontological claim about the actual 
nature of physical systems, whereas the latter seems to involve only a (sophisticated) way 
of making reference to a given system. Adopting the former reading of “definition” in the 
context of mathematical physics seems to imply the radical claim that there is no 
ontological distinction between mathematical and physical objects. And—it is known—
this position leads to difficult epistemological problems (see Resnik 1990 for a review of 
these). However, I consider that any attempt to draw metaphysical conclusions from the 
formalism of Mechanics should be preceded by a careful study of the mechanisms 
enabling mathematical objects to refer to physical ones. Thus, it seems to me a more 
prudent attitude, at least at the outset and tentatively, to consider “definition”, 
“determination” and “characterization”, as these occur in modern texts, as intended 
synonyms.  
In considering the mathematical descriptions of physical systems, prior to the 
ontological question “Are physical systems really mathematical objects?”,  I hence 
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want to pose the epistemic question “Can a physical system be fully and unambiguously 
characterized by some mathematical object? And for the answer to this question to be 
yes, which properties is this mathematical object required to have?”  
It is to the investigation of this last question, particularly in the context of 
Mechanics, that this work is devoted. Hopefully, from the perspective of a philosopher, 
this should lead to a better appreciation of what is involved in the mathematical 
characterization of physical systems, insight that cannot but benefit those trying to adopt 
an ontological understanding of these characterizations. In particular those defending a 
realistic interpretation of the wave function in Quantum Mechanics could be led by such 
an analysis to a better grasp of their commitments.  
The remainder of this paper has two main parts. The first, more general one, 
attempts further to clarify the question I posed above. In Section 2.1., I compare the 
expectations of different theoretical physicists regarding the descriptive power of the 
mathematical characterizations of mechanical systems. In Section 2.2., mathematical 
structuralism enters into the picture by the crucial observation that most often definitions 
in mathematical physics are stated “up to isomorphism”.  In Section 2.3., I propose a 
precise requirement for the individuation of physical states of a system which any 
mathematical object must meet in order to be a candidate for the description of that 
system. Then, the second part of the paper is restricted to Quantum Mechanics and aims 
to study some techniques used to implement this requirement for the individuation of 
states. Section 3.1 is a quick introduction to three different approaches to this problem—
algebraic, group-theoretic and geometric. Section 3.2 studies how individuating 
properties may emerge from the introduction of groups and Section 3.3. presents in some 
detail the example of the group SO(3). I conclude with some remarks in Section 4.  
 
2. Requirement of individuation for physical states 
 
2.1. The descriptive power of mathematical definitions of physical systems 
In modern treatments of theoretical physics, a definition of a physical system is 
typically a statement of the following form: 
Definition: A physical system S is given by {A1, …, An} such that … 
Here {A1, …, An} is a set of mathematical objects verifying some particular 
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conditions.  In Mechanics, definitions of this sort are not intended to apply to all physical 
systems but just to a restricted class—say, non-relativistic, classical, holonomic systems 
with a finite number of degrees of freedom. However, inside this class, these definitions 
do apply to any system and it is in this sense that I say they are definitions of a generic 
physical system.  
It does not seem too risky to say that most physicists would agree on this point. 
Starting from here, there are two major aspects where they may disagree. First, obviously, 
they may not agree on the content of the definition, but it cannot be the aim of this paper 
to decide which content is “the correct one”. Instead, we will simply try to establish, by 
means of general considerations, some criteria of what it means for a mathematical 
definition of a system to be acceptable. Thus, we need to know which is the purpose of 
these definitions; it is here that we encounter a second, subtler source of disagreement.  
There are two principal contrasting attitudes one can adopt here. On the one hand, 
one can follow a “formalist perspective” and consider these definitions simply as a 
device to detect the minimal framework necessary to develop most of the (mathematical) 
techniques used in the study of physical systems. For example, as soon as one has a 
manifold Γ equipped with a symplectic structure ω and a preferred function H, one can 
write Hamilton’s equations of motion. In other words, the equations of motions do not 
provide any supplementary information that is not already contained in the triple {Γ, ω, 
H}. Here, mathematical definitions point to the theoretical locus where all the 
information about a system is stored; but there is a fundamental gap between the 
mathematical description and the physical interpretation. To actually refer to a given, 
particular physical system, it is not enough to have the formal, abstract description of it: 
one needs to add external information that conveys to it its physical interpretation. An 
explicit example of this viewpoint is found in Strocchi’s book on Quantum Mechanics: 
In the mathematical literature, given a C*-algebra A, any normalized positive linear 
functional on it is by definition a state; here we allow the possibility that the set S of 
states with physical interpretation (briefly called physical states) is […] smaller than 
the set of all the normalized positive linear functionals on A. (Strocchi 2005, pp. 22-
23, my emphasis) 
There is a sharp contrast between what is declared by definition in Mathematics and what 
is to be interpreted in Physics.  
On the other hand, one can pursue a “descriptive perspective”, and consider that 
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the abstract mathematical characterization of a physical system encapsulates all the 
information about the system without the need of any further external interpretation. 
Whereas the formalist perspective downplays the descriptive role of the mathematical 
definition of a physical system by demanding that a physical interpretation be also given, 
this other contrasting perspective confers full descriptive power on the mathematical 
formalism. On this viewpoint, one considers that if a physicist is given the abstract 
description of a given physical system and nothing more, she will nonetheless be able to 
recognize which physical system is being described. For example, if she studies the 
classical mechanical system defined by the triple {Γ, ω, H}, where (Γ, ω) = T*R 
equipped with its canonical symplectic form and H(q,p) = p2/2m, one expects her to 
recognize a free massive (non-relativistic) particle moving in a one-dimensional space. 
To me, this is what Rovelli has in mind when he declares: “a dynamical system is 
completely defined by a presymplectic space (Σ, ω)” (Rovelli 2004, p. 101, my 
emphasis). It is also the perspective adopted by Landsman when he criticizes the use of 
Hilbert spaces in Quantum Mechanics:  
“all Hilbert spaces of a given dimension are isomorphic, so that one cannot 
characterize a physical system by saying that ‘its Hilbert space of (pure) states is 
L2(R3)’.” (Landsman 1998, p.6),  
For it is only when expecting full descriptive power to flow from the mathematical 
characterization of a physical system that worries about the fact there is only one infinite-
dimensional Hilbert space arise. From the formalist perspective, there is no reason why 
the fact that all Hilbert spaces are isomorphic should be seen as supplying the motivation 
to build an alternative, possibly more sophisticated, formalism for Quantum Mechanics. 
Indeed, from that point of view one should never expect to fully characterize a physical 
system just by “saying that ‘its Hilbert space of (pure) states is L2(R3)’”, since an 
additional physical interpretation, that transcends the formal language, is needed. 
 The difference between both perspectives can be rendered precise using the 
elementary language of type theory as follows3. Consider first two different types: the 
“Physics type” Tphys whose tokens are the mechanical systems, and the “Mathematics 
type” Tmath whose tokens are the mathematical objects used to describe the systems under 
consideration. The mathematical definition of a physical system may be seen as a map 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For our purposes, type theory is very similar to set theory: the type/token relation is the analogue of the 
set/element relation. The reason why I choose the language of type theory rather than of set theory will 
become clear in the next section. 
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from Tphys to Tmath that, to every physical system S, associates the mathematical object 
D(S) describing it. Now, the properties ascribed to this map are what fundamentally 
distinguish the two perspectives. Indeed, the main claim of the descriptive perspective, as 
I understand it, is the injectivity of this map: 
Faithfulness requirement (descriptive perspective): consider two physical 
systems S and S’ defined by the mathematical objects D(S) and D(S’).  We 
have D(S) =M D(S’) if and only if S =P S’. 
This is of course tantamount to saying that any difference between two physical systems 
should be reflected in their respective mathematical descriptions—a requirement which is 
not imposed in the formalist perspective. 
One might argue that the descriptive perspective is too naïve and that it is in 
principle impossible for an abstract, formal, mathematical description to capture “all 
there is” about a real, concrete, physical system. However, in common with other moves 
that attempt to undermine a research program by appeal to such extremely general 
arguments, I find this position sterile. Rather I believe that adopting the descriptive 
perspective as a working hypothesis and seeking to push it to its limits can yield 
interesting insights in theoretical physics, even if we are eventually led to reject the 
hypothesis. As Catren beautifully said of a different though not altogether unrelated topic: 
“It is necessary to be programmatically ambitious in order to fail in a productive way” 
(Catren 2009, p. 470). 
 Thus, we will try to travel as far as possible along the road that the descriptive 
perspective suggests. As it will become progressively clearer, the faithfulness 
requirement imposes some strong conditions on the mathematical formalisms to be used 
for Mechanics. One of the main points of this paper is to show how some of the technical 
developments in the mathematical foundations of Mechanics arise as attempts to meet 
these conditions. 
 
2.2. Mathematical objects as structures 
It is fundamental to remark that the faithfulness requirement, imposed by the 
descriptive perspective, presupposes two underlying notions of identity: a first one 
between mathematical objects (denoted by =M), and another independent notion of 
identity between physical systems (denoted by =P). There is not an absolute notion of 
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identity and every given type has its own criteria of identification4. To incorporate this 
requirement into Mechanics, it is of crucial importance to know when we can say, for two 
mathematical objects A and A’, that we have A =M A’. When pursued to its furthest 
reaches and ramifications, this simple question about identity in Mathematics raises very 
far-reaching issues connected to the development of n-categories and homotopy type 
theory, while in the Philosophy of Mathematics it leads to perennial questions about the 
ontology of Mathematics. Since our concern here is with the mathematics of theoretical 
Mechanics, we do not dare to address these questions in their full generality but confine 
ourselves to those aspects relevant to the practice of theoretical physics. 
Von Neumann’s proof of the mathematical equivalence of Heisenberg’s ‘matrix 
mechanics’ and Schrödinger’s ‘wave mechanics’ was a celebrated landmark in the 
development of Quantum Mechanics. Then, the Stone-von Neumann theorem secured 
that indeed a certain quantum system was uniquely defined by the requirement of being 
an irreducible representation of (Weyl’s form of) the canonical commutation relations: 
the formalisms of Heisenberg (using the abstract Hilbert space of infinite complex 
matrices), Schrödinger (using the Hilbert space L2(R)) and Fock (using the Hilbert space 
ℓ2(N) of all square-summable sequences) appeared as three equivalent realizations of one 
and the same mathematical object describing one and the same physical system5.   
The important point is that the founders of the quantum theory considered the 
physical system to be uniquely described because they considered equivalent 
representations as identical. Otherwise stated, two abstract descriptions of a quantum 
system had to be considered identical if isomorphic6. Thus, the above example shows 
how it clearly emerged, from the historical development of the theory, that for the 
purposes of Physics, the relevant notion of identity for mathematical objects was in fact 
isomorphism:  
D(S) =M D(S’) ⇔	  D(S) ≃ D(S’) 
As is well explained in Rodin (2011), in dealing with mathematical objects defined up to 
isomorphism one enters into the realm of mathematical structuralism. In fact, this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This point on identity is precisely one of the deepest differences between type theory (contextual identity) 
and set theory (absolute identity). It is because of this difference that the language of type theory seems 
better adapted to our discussion. 
5 For an explicit treatment of these formalisms, see for example (Gazeau 2009, pp. 13-18). 
6 Indeed, when working in the category of all representations (of a given C*-algebra) “equivalence of 
representations” is just another name for the general concept of “isomorphism”. 
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move—of extending the notion of equality to that of isomorphism—has been recently 
dubbed the “Principle of Structuralism” (Awodey 2013). One is thereby forced to 
endorse the Principle of Structuralism in the mathematical foundations of Quantum 
Mechanics.  
It is striking that consciousness of this development—of always having to read the 
abstract mathematical definitions of physical systems ‘up to isomorphism’—has not so 
clearly being carried over from Quantum to Classical Mechanics. In the latter context, it 
is for example rare to consider the phase space of a system to be given by a symplectic 
manifold ‘up to symplectomorphism’7. Instead, one generally has the impression of 
working with a particular symplectic manifold and sticking to it, without considering any 
‘change of representation’—think of the free massive non-relativistic particle: one will 
almost universally work in the cotangent bundle T*R3. However, a brief reflection shows 
this is not the case, and that one is in fact working up to isomorphism. Indeed, continuing 
with the same example, one can instead decide to work in the space R3×R3 and impose ω  
= dqi ∧ dpi as an ad hoc definition; the physical system ought to be the same, but this 
symplectic space is identical to the cotangent bundle only insofar as it is 
symplectomorphic to it8. Thus, the Principle of Structuralism is also apparent in the 
Classical theory. But there, it seems to be less explicitly recognized than in the Quantum 
case. It seems to me that one reason for this oversight is that in Classical Mechanics it is 
much easier to adopt a directly realist reading of the mathematical formalism—the 
configuration space R3 ‘really is the Euclidean space out there’. Contrary to what 
happens in Quantum Mechanics, the Classical Realm typically does not force us into 
higher levels of abstraction and one can still retain the impression of the ‘materiality’ of 
the mathematical constructions involved. But it is an impression we must abandon.  
Precisely, the whole point of mathematical structuralism is to insist that, beyond 
certain explicitly stated properties, the specific nature of the elements in a structure—i.e., 
the ‘materiality’ I just referred to—is completely irrelevant: 
…there is a certain degree of ‘analysis’ or specificity required […], and beyond that, 
it does not matter what the structures are supposed to be or to ‘consist of’— the 
elements […] are simply undetermined. (Awodey 2004, p. 59) 
Von Neumann himself also stressed this point from the outset: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 A ‘symplectomorphism’ is an isomorphism in the category of symplectic manifolds. 
8 As sets, these two spaces are different. Whence, sensu stricto, they are not identical. 
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…a unified theory, independent of the accidents of the formal framework selected at 
the time, and exhibiting only the really essential elements of quantum mechanics, 
will then be achieved if we […] investigate the intrinsic properties (common to 
L2(R) and ℓ2(N)) […], and choose these properties as a starting point (von Neumann 
1955, p. 33, my emphasis). 
As long as the canonical commutation relations are implemented, it does not matter 
whether the Hilbert space describing the quantum particle is made of functions over a 
space, infinite sequences of complex numbers, or sections of a certain fiber bundle. It 
does not matter either whether the points of the space describing the classical particle are 
points of a cotangent bundle, of a Cartesian space or of the dual of a Lie algebroid. This 
is why Awodey calls them “schematic structures” (Awodey 2004, p. 62).  The 
mathematical objects involved in the definitions of mechanical objects are schematic 
structures.  
 
2.3. The requirement of individuation for physical states 
We have already seen how Landsman expresses his dissatisfaction with the use of 
Hilbert spaces as the mathematical basis for the characterization of physical systems. Of 
course, many others share this view: it is at the root of von Neumann’s motivation in 
studying rings of operators and in introducing the so-called von Neumann algebras 
(Rédei 1997). We are now in a position to understand, in very simple terms, the source of 
this dissatisfaction. For, if you combine the seemingly inescapable—at least for the 
mathematics of Mechanics—Principle of Structuralism with the faithfulness requirement 
of the descriptive perspective, the fact that there is only one infinite-dimensional Hilbert 
space (up to isomorphism) shows that either there is only one unique Quantum system; or 
that Hilbert spaces do not provide enough descriptive resources for the characterization of 
mechanical systems. 
The classical analogue of this is Darboux’s theorem: any two symplectic manifolds 
of the same dimension are locally isomorphic. For a given dimension, we thus get 
infinitely many non-isomorphic symplectic manifolds, but their differences are only of a 
topological nature. Whereas Hilbert spaces evidently fall short of accounting for the 
diversity of the Quantum realm and hence cannot be taken as an acceptable 
characterization of physical systems, it is not so clear whether the same conclusion can 
be drawn about the use of symplectic manifolds in Classical Mechanics.  Undoubtedly, 
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we are missing here further criteria that would allow us to decide when a type of structure 
is “descriptive enough” to be an acceptable candidate for characterizing physical systems. 
The existence of numerically many non-isomorphic structures of a given type is surely 
one criterion, but it cannot be the only one. 
In all situations considered so far, there was a two-fold move in order to 
mathematically capture all the physical information: first, the system was said to be 
characterized by the set of all its possible states; second, it was this set that was meant to 
be described by some mathematical space. At the end, one gets the so-called “phase 
portrait” of the system (Abraham and Marsden 1978, p. xviii). A state was intended to be 
described by a point of the symplectic manifold Γ in the classical Hamiltonian formalism, 
and by a ray of the Hilbert space H in the standard quantum formalism9. Now, recall that 
in the descriptive perspective, one expects the theoretical physicist to be able to extract, 
simply from the given abstract mathematical structure describing the system, all the 
relevant physical information. In particular, given an element of this structure—a point of 
the symplectic manifold or a ray of the Hilbert space—one expects her to be capable of 
recognizing the specific state of the system. But, for this to be possible, the mathematical 
structure describing a physical system must be such that its different elements can be 
properly distinguished. In other words, if the mathematical definition is all there is to 
know in order to completely determine a physical system, one is confronted with the 
following requirement: 
Requirement of individuation for physical states: it must be possible, in 
practice, to qualitatively identify any specific physical state within the 
mathematical structure used to define the system. 
As we now show, this requirement imposes, on the structures that can in principle 
characterize mechanical systems, much stronger conditions than the previous faithfulness 
requirement. To see this, let us unpack what the requirement of individuation is actually 
saying. Firstly, it is important to understand the difference between “being able to identify 
a physical state” and “being able to distinguish between two physical states”. In a short 
paper from 1976, Quine introduced three different ways of distinguishing two objects. 
According to him, two objects are (in decreasing order of discernibility)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 A ray of a Hilbert space is a one-dimensional subspace. 
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• absolutely discernible if there exists a one-place predicate that is true of one 
object but not of the other (e.g. two spheres of different color), 
• relatively discernible if there exists a two-place relation that is true of them in 
one order but not in the other (e.g. two spheres of the same color but different 
size), 
• weakly discernible if there exists a two-place irreflexive relation that is true of 
them (e.g. two qualitatively identical spheres, as considered in (Black 
1952)).10 
One important motivation for introducing this distinction was reconciling Leibniz’s 
Principle of Indiscernibles with the existence of some highly homogeneous mathematical 
objects—such as the Euclidean plane, where all points seem indiscernible from each 
other. The (somewhat irritating) question was then: “Since any predicate true of one 
given point of the Euclidean plane will also be true of any other point, how can you 
possibly know there is more than just one point in this plane?” Weak discernibility was 
meant to provide a rigorous answer to this: it allows you to determine how many identical 
iron spheres there are in Black’s otherwise empty universe. However, a physicist dealing 
with a particular system will not only want to describe the number of different possible 
states. He will also need to make objective reference to a certain, particular state in such a 
way that any other physicist will understand which state he is referring to.  
I say an element in a structure can be identified (or individuated) if there exists a 
one-place predicate that allows absolute discernibility from any other element. In this 
way, paraphrasing Weyl, we find “a conceptual fixation [of the element] that would 
enable one to reconstruct [it] when it has been lost”11.  
Secondly, this identification needs to be “qualitative”. As Dieks (2014) rightly 
points out, Quine’s whole distinction implicitly depends on the kind of predicates 
allowed. For, if among the accepted predicates are included “referential devices as proper 
names, proper adjectives and verbs”, then any two objects possessing a thisness will 
automatically become absolutely discernible, and the grades of discriminability become 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In (Quine 1960), the author introduced the distinction between absolute and relative discernibility. The 
third term was introduced in (Quine 1976), but there he changed “relative discernibility” into “moderate 
discernibility”. However, I follow the terminology that has been adopted in the philosophy of physics 
literature (Saunders 2006, Dieks 2014). 
11 In the original, Weyl writes:  “A conceptual fixation of points by labels […] that would enable one to 
reconstruct any point when it has been lost, is here possible only in relation to a coordinate system, or frame 
of reference, that has to be exhibited by an individual demonstrative act.” (Weyl 1949, p. 75) 
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useless12. Therefore, a criterion, for what Dieks calls the “scientific respectability of 
relations [and predicates]”, has to be introduced. Fortunately, since we are here dealing 
with mathematical objects that are schematic structures, we know precisely which 
predicates are “scientifically respectable” in this context. As Esfeld and Lam stress,  
It goes without saying that there is in [structuralism] no question of identity 
conditions for an object independently of other objects. But this does not mean that 
relations cannot provide identity conditions. Which relations make up for identity 
conditions for which types of objects depends obviously on the case under 
consideration. (Esfeld and Lam 2009, p. 8) 
More precisely, to insure the relations —and predicates built from relations—do not 
depend on the superfluous nature of the elements in the structure, the allowed, respectable 
properties have to be invariant under any isomorphism. These properties are called 
“structural” by Awodey (2013, p.5) and “objective” by Weyl (1949, p. 73).  
Thus, if a mathematical structure is to fulfill the requirement of individuation, 
physical states have to be individuated by ‘objective’ or ‘structural’ properties. In 
particular, these properties have to be invariant under any automorphism. This simple 
remark is actually very fruitful, for it furnishes a practical tool to detect the “amount of 
individuation” that can be provided within a given mathematical structure. Indeed, by the 
above definitions, it follows that two elements related by such an automorphism cannot 
be absolutely distinguished—and hence cannot be individuated either. In fact, the orbits 
of the group of automorphisms are the smallest subsets of the structure that can be 
identified or individuated13. The (internal) descriptive power of a structure is thus 
encapsulated in the action of its group of automorphisms, and we arrive at the following 
consequence: if a physical system is to be completely characterized by a mathematical 
structure S (that constitutes its phase portrait), then its possible physical states ought to 
be described by the orbits of the automorphism group Aut(S).  
To conclude this section, notice how this new point of view provides yet another 
way of understanding the lack of descriptive power of Hilbert spaces. Indeed, given an n-
dimensional Hilbert space H, its group of automorphisms is the group U(n) of unitary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Adams (1979) introduced a distinction between “thisness” and “suchness”. Intuitively, the thisness (or 
haecceity) is the property of an object that allows one to point at it and say in a meaningful way ‘this 
object’. On the other hand, “suchness” is a synonym of “qualitative property”—and also, in this paper, of 
“objective property” and “structural property”. 
13 Given the left action of a group G on a set E, the orbit Ox of an element x is the subset of elements of E to 
which x can be transformed by some element of G. 
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transformations. Now, a pure state of a quantum system is supposed to be described by a 
ray of this Hilbert space, but the action of U(n) on the set of all rays is transitive: the 
projective Hilbert space is completely homogeneous and no physical state can be 
individuated. Indeed it turns out this property of homogeneity or maximal symmetry can 
even be used to define projective Hilbert spaces (Ashtekar and Schilling 1997, section 
III.B.). 
 
3. Methods for introducing individuality into Quantum Mechanics 
 
Let me briefly summarize what has been said so far. When dealing with a certain 
class of physical systems, the mathematical characterization of a generic system aims to 
describe the phase portrait of all its possible states. The mathematical objects involved 
are defined only up to isomorphism and are thus, in Awodey’s terms, “schematic 
structures”. If, rather than describing the minimal framework, one expects these 
mathematical definitions to completely capture all the physical information of a given 
system—endorsing hence what I called the descriptive perspective—one is led to the 
strong requirement of individuation for physical states. On the other hand, the main 
ingredients of the standard formalisms of both Classical and Quantum Mechanics—
namely, symplectic manifolds and Hilbert spaces—do not meet the latter demand. There 
thus emerges a fundamental tension between the intended purpose of the mathematical 
definitions of mechanical systems and the basic formalism used in the theory.  
The main thesis of the present paper is that this tension has been one of the driving 
forces in the Foundations of (Quantum) Mechanics, in the sense that many of the 
developments in this field can be retrospectively understood as attempts to overcome it. 
The second part of the work is devoted to a brief survey of some of the mathematical 
notions introduced in the quantum formalism in the light of this understanding. 
 
3.1. Three approaches to introducing individuality 
At this point, the essential problem we face in the standard quantum formalism is 
the lack of enough qualitative properties: given only an abstract Hilbert space, it is 
impossible to make unambiguous reference to a specific ray without appealing to any 
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primitive thisness—this is the content of Weyl’s previous citation14. But “science is 
averse to the use of the notion of haecceity, “primitive thisness”, in order to individuate 
objects” (Dieks 2014, p. 43). To avoid this, one option would be to discard Hilbert spaces 
from the outset and start looking for completely new mathematical structures that would 
do the job. However, the use of Hilbert spaces in the practice of Quantum Mechanics is 
so widespread and deep-rooted, that an alternative may be sought—namely, to retain 
Hilbert spaces but enrich them with further structure: i) consider projective Hilbert spaces 
as a sort of homogeneous underlying receptacle involved in the description of any 
physical system; and ii) describe a concrete and specific system with a (slightly) more 
sophisticated mathematical setting, that would somehow break this homogeneity and 
convey to the different physical states qualitative properties sufficient to distinguish 
them. In other words, address the problem of how to transform a mere numerical 
multiplicity into a multiplicity of qualitatively distinct elements15.  
In the standard formalism, the key technical concept needed to implement this idea 
of “adding extra structure” is that of a representation: to describe a system, one should 
not consider a bare Hilbert space but, instead, a Hilbert space only insofar as it is the 
canvas on which some external information is instantiated. There are at least three 
different strategies that have been followed in mathematical Physics. 
i) Physical systems as representations of algebras. First, one can claim the 
crucial information about a physical system lies in the algebraic structure of 
the observables. Thus, a physical system would be described by the 
representation of an abstract C*-algebra A—that is, by a triple (A, H, π) where 
H is a Hilbert space and π is a morphism of C*-algebras from A to B(H), the 
algebra of all bounded operators. This road leads to the algebraic formulation 
of Quantum Mechanics (Strocchi 2005) and the theory of algebraic quantum 
fields (Haag 1996). 
ii) Physical systems as representations of groups. On the other hand, one can try 
to build up the theory by focusing on the notion of group, in which case the 
set of possible states is to be mathematically described by a unitary group 
representation—that is, by a triple (G, H, ρ) where G is now a group and ρ is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See footnote 9. 
15 By "numerical multiplicity” I mean a multiplicity of elements that are only weakly discernible. A 
mathematical structure is a numerical multiplicity if the action of its group of automorphisms is transitive.  
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morphism of groups from G to U(H), the group of all unitary operators. This 
is the road famously followed by Wigner (1959), Eddington (1939) and 
Souriau (2005), among many others. 
iii) Physical systems as systems of imprimitivity. In Mackey’s approach to 
Quantum Mechanics, the central notion is that of a G-space (i.e. a space X 
equipped with a group action) and an (elementary) quantum system is then 
defined as an (irreducible) representation of a G-space. A representation of a 
G-space is more commonly called a system of imprimitivity16. 
Paraphrasing Castellani, I call these the algebraic, group-theoretical and 
geometrical approaches to the problem of individuation of physical states17. To take an 
example, consider again the description of the non-relativistic spin-zero particle moving 
in a three-dimensional space. This quantum system could not be characterized solely by 
the Hilbert space L2(R3). For an algebraist—who considers properties (observables) to be 
primitive—it is to be determined as an irreducible representation of the Weyl algebra18 
and it is well-defined because of the Stone-von Neumann uniqueness theorem; for a 
group-theorist—who considers symmetries to be primitive—the system is defined as the 
only irreducible unitary representation of the Heisenberg group H7; finally, for a 
geometer—who considers space to be primitive—the system is defined as an irreducible 
representation of the action of translations on the Euclidean space, and the uniqueness of 
the definition is secured through Mackey’s theorem of imprimitivity.  
Despite their differences, there is a clear technical sense in which the definitions are 
equivalent for this particular quantum system (for example, the Weyl algebra is 
isomorphic to the group C*-algebra associated to the Heisenberg group (Strocchi 2005, 
p.60)). Moreover, the three approaches share the same underlying idea: they add 
something to the initial abstract Hilbert space, and, by doing so, they define a new 
structure with a reduced group of automorphisms. In turn, this reduction entails an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Hence, in this third option, a system is described by a tuple (H, G, X, ρX, ρH, π) where ρX is the action of G 
on X, ρH is the action of G on H  and π is a C*-algebra morphism from C0(X,  ) to B(H). For a modern 
introduction to Mackey’s approach, see Landsman 2006 and Varadarajan 2007. 
17 In (Castellani 1998), the author considers the problem of constitution of physical objects: “What kind of 
properties and prescriptions do we need in order to construct an object?”, and then studies “the group-
theoretic approach to the problem […] grounded on the idea of invariance.” (p. 182). 
18 In Strocchi’s words: “The abstract algebra generated by (abstract) elements U(α), V(β),  α, β   R […] 
satisfying U(α) V(β) = V(β) U(α) exp(-iαβ), U(α) U(β) = U(α+β) and V(α) V(β) = V(α+β) is called the Weyl 
algebra.” (Strocchi 2005, pp.58-59) Notice his insistence on the abstract character of this definition. 
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emergence of some qualitative properties: not all rays will be related to each other by an 
automorphism, and a certain amount of individuality has thereby been introduced.  
Nonetheless, the question still remains: Are these new definitions acceptable? Do 
these newly introduced structures provide the means for conferring individuality on 
physical states? To answer this, we need to investigate how structural properties are 
defined and which substructures they allow us to individuate. In the next section, we shall 
explain the mechanism of individuation in the group-theoretical approach, leaving the 
analysis of the other two strategies for future research. 
 
3.2. Properties in the group-theoretical approach 
Let us restate the problem from the group-theoretic viewpoint. Essentially, the 
difficulty encountered with Hilbert spaces is that their group of automorphisms is too big: 
there is only one orbit (the action of Aut(H) is transitive) and it is thus impossible to find 
invariant properties that would differentiate different subspaces of H. To break the 
homogeneity of this given Hilbert space, an abstract group G, external and independent 
to H, is added. This allows to select, among all available transformations of the space 
state (Aut(H)), those that should be considered as meaningful (ρ(G)). More precisely, 
whereas an automorphism of H will not necessarily be an automorphism of H G =(G, H, 
ρ), the elements in ρ(G) will19.  Therefore, in this perspective, abstract groups enter the 
picture, not in order to introduce symmetries, but in order to break them—this is quite 
the opposite of what is usually thought.  
In particular, since structural properties are by definition invariant under 
isomorphisms, they need to be invariant under the action of the abstract group G. Put 
differently, it is possible to individuate a subspace of H only if it is stable under this 
action. Now, recall H G is meant to characterize the phase space of the physical system. 
This means the smallest subspaces of H that can be individuated are to be regarded as 
describing physical states. By the above argument, physical states ought then to be 
described by G-invariant subspaces that contain no smaller invariant subspaces. But this 
is precisely the technical definition of an irreducible representation! Hence, the group-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 To see this, consider an element g of the group G. The unitary representation (G, H, ρ’) defined by 
ρ’(g’)=ρ(g)ρ(g’)ρ(g-1) for any g’ in G is equivalent to (G, H, ρ), and the intertwining operator that achieves 
the isomorphism is precisely ρ(g).  
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theoretical approach to the individuation of physical states leads naturally to the 
following conclusion: 
Description of states and properties: if a specific quantum system is 
(described by) the schematic structure (G, H, ρ), then a state is necessarily an 
irreducible representation and physical properties are indices 20  of these 
representations.  
Of course, this should recall Wigner’s famous definition of particles as irreducible 
representations of the Poincaré group (Wigner 1939), as well as Weyl’s insight that “[a]ll 
quantum numbers […] are indices characterizing representations of groups” (Weyl 1950, 
p.xxi) (more recently, this has also been at the origin of a careful and ambitious group-
theoretical analysis of Mechanics (Catren 2014)). The strength of this whole approach, 
which rests on an analysis of the theoretical means required to objectively single out 
specific quantum states, is that, not only do we recover Weyl’s observation, but we also 
understand that it could not have been otherwise: quantum numbers must be indices of 
representations simply because they must be structural properties. 
 
3.3. An example: the group S0(3) and angular momentum  states 
To illustrate the procedure of individuation in the group-theoretical setting, 
consider a quantum system whose only property is angular momentum. It can be, for 
example, a free spherical top. It is then customary to take the Hilbert space of states to be 
L2(SO(3)) (Ashtekar and Lewandowski 2004, section IV.A.). In the light of what has been 
said, this actually means that one takes the regular representation of the group SO(3), and 
that L2(SO(3)), equipped with the natural left action of SO(3), is a realization of this 
representation.  
To distinguish the different possible states of the system, one first needs to look for 
the irreducible representations. This is done by the Peter-Weyl theorem: it decomposes 
the (infinite-dimensional) regular representation into the direct sum of all (equivalence 
classes of) finite-dimensional irreducible representations:  
L2(SU(2)) = ⊕ ml Vl  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 An ‘index’ is a number that takes different values for different representations.  
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where ml = 2l+1 = dim Vl  is the multiplicity of each irreducible representation Vl. From 
this decomposition emerges the first quantum property—in physics: the total angular 
momentum; in mathematics: the highest weight. It is the index l that allows the 
individuation of the different subspaces Vl.  
But this is not enough, for if we want to capture the states, we also need to 
individuate the one-dimensional subspaces lying inside each Vl. In the mathematical 
theory of Cartan-Weyl, this move corresponds to considering the maximal abelian 
subgroup—in this case, U(1)—and once again breaking the irreducible representations of 
the whole group into irreducible representations of the subgroup: 
Vl = ⊕Vl,m  
In this second stage what emerges is the second quantum property—in physics: the 
magnetic quantum numbers; in mathematics: the weights. It is the index m characterizing 
these one-dimensional irreducible representations of U(1). 
Thus, in this description that only uses Hilbert spaces and groups, there is a basis of 
states that can be discerned using a set of objective properties. Whereas elements of a 
bare projective Hilbert space did not possess any qualitative properties, the introduction 
of an abstract group has brought about an emergence of different qualitative properties 
and successfully transformed the homogeneous canvas of a numerical multiplicity into a 




Among the most debated issues in the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics, the 
interpretation of the wave function occupies a central place (Dorato and Laudisa, 2015). 
In this context, many of the arguments for or against a realist wave function ontology 
seem to rely heavily on the definition of a wave function as a complex-valued function 
over configuration space. But the mathematical developments in the foundations of 
Mechanics clearly show there is no reason to prefer a description of physical states in 
terms of functions over configuration space rather than, for example, in terms of abstract 
square-summable sequences. Therefore, before trying to build an ontology for the theory, 
it seems to me crucial to understand precisely how physical systems are described in the 
mathematical formalism of Mechanics. The aim of the paper was to start investigating 
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this question, and to trace the consequences of taking such formal descriptions seriously. 
The analysis paid special attention to the way (in)discernibility was handled. The results 
can be summarized as follows:  
1. The mathematical objects used in the definitions of physical systems are 
schematic structures, insofar as they are defined only up to isomorphism. The 
precise nature of the elements in the structure is either a meaningless notion or 
an otiose one, and in any case should be irrelevant to any philosophical of the 
formalism of Quantum Mechanics. 
2. Moreover, a quantum system cannot be mathematically characterized by a 
projective Hilbert space, since the elements of such a space are only weakly 
discernible. This is technically captured by the transitive action of the group of 
automorphisms. To introduce individuality and qualitative properties, one 
needs to add extra structure. 
3. In the group-theoretical approach, the emergence of qualitative properties 
conferring individuality to the different states occurs through a mechanism of 
restriction: an abstract group G is introduced, conveying a physical meaning to 
a restricted set of the group of automorphisms. States are described as 
irreducible representations of some group and quantum properties, because of 
their structural nature, are necessarily indices characterizing them.  
Strange as it may sound, this analysis shows there is no clear-cut understanding of 
what a wave function—i.e. a quantum state—actually is. At any rate, any sound 
definition will involve highly abstract entities, such as C*-algebras or the Heisenberg 
group. Therefore, wave function realists seem to be necessarily committed to being realist 
about these abstract schematic structures. They will thus be realist about a big part of 
pure Mathematics, and this is a step they may not want to take.  	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